Dear
friends,
When one
looks at
the
substance
of the
new
Constitutional
draft,
one
cannot
help but
think
that
politicians
who look
set and
ready to
become
Members
of
Parliament
(MPs)
after
the
upcoming
general
election
must
certainly
be among
those
who
support
the
draft.
This is
because
several
constitutional
draft
provisions
reflect
the
intention
to allow
MPs, as
people’s
representatives,
more
autonomy
and
freedom
in
fulfilling
their
duties
without
having
to toe
the
strict
lines of
their
respective
political
parties.
Some
of these
provisions
seek to
give MPs
more
freedom
from
their
parties
in
posing
questions,
opening
debates,
and
giving
no-confidence
votes (Section
158,
paragraph
two).
Other
clauses
will
enable a
group of
at least
20 MPs
to
submit a
legislative
bill
without
having
to
obtain
prior
consent
from
their
political
parties
(Section
138(2)).
It is
true
that
giving
MPs more
autonomy
and
leeway
is
giving
them
opportunity
to make
decisions
based on
their
own
conscience
in
serving
the
people.
However,
it is
also
worth
pondering
if such
an
approach
would
result
in
weaker
political
parties.
For
one
thing,
by
turning
MPs into
‘individuals’
with
rights,
autonomy,
and
freedom
from the
influence
of their
political
parties
and who
are not
beholden
to the
party’s
administrative
control,
one
makes it
seem as
if
political
parties
do not
matter
much,
possess
no
significant
ideological
substance,
wield
little
power to
back a
policy
direction,
and have
little
say in
making
their
MPs toe
the
management
line.
The
people
and the
MPs
themselves
would
certainly
come to
view
political
parties
as
insignificant
and
dispensable.
In a way,
the
autonomy
of MPs
from
their
political
parties
indicates
that
Thailand’s
political
parties
often
lack
ideological
strength
and
party
platforms.
Attempts
to amend
the
Constitution
in this
regard
are
hence
often
justified
on the
grounds
of
public
interest.
It is
hoped
that MPs
will be
able to
fulfill
their
roles in
solving
constituency
problems
without
facing
administrative
or
financial
restrictions
from
their
parties,
which in
the past
have
been
seen as
obstacles
to the
implementation
of MP
duties.
Practically
speaking,
one may
have to
admit
that the
present
circumstances
offer
some
justification
to
giving
MPs more
autonomy.
This is
because
Thailand’s
political
parties
remain
little
more
than
groupings
of
vested
interest
owned
and
managed
by
financially
influential
figures.
These
political
parties
do not
reflect
any
particular
political
ideologies
or
policy
standpoints
and do
not
sufficiently
represent
the
mutual
decision-making
among
their
members.
Having
said
that, in
the long
run the
Constitution
will
eventually
have to
recognize
the
value
and
importance
of
political
parties
as
groupings
of MPs
responsible
for
national
administration.
The
internal
consistency
and
unity
within
political
parties
is
certainly
crucial
in
ensuring
smooth
and
efficient
policy
implementation.
Political
parties
also
need to
have
leaders
and
their
management
corps to
make
decisions
on
issues
and
define
party
platforms.
Legislative
proposals,
for
example,
should
be
derived
through
a
consensus
or
mutual
agreement
within
the
party
and
reflect
that
party’s
policy
positions.
In this
way,
allowing
a group
of 20
MPs to
propose
legislative
bills
may
cause
policy
disunity
within
political
parties
and make
it
difficult
for
party
leaders
to
efficiently
control
party
management
direction.
Therefore,
although
giving
more
autonomy
to MPs
in
acting
as
people’s
representatives
and
freeing
them
from the
cumbersome
influence
of
political
parties
may
render
some
benefit
to the
public,
it is
imperative
that
emphasis
also be
given to
supporting
the
development
of
ideologically
based
political
parties
in
Thailand.
Ideally,
these
political
parties
should
be
‘public’
in the
sense
that
they are
owned by
the
people
and have
ideological
standpoints
and
clear
party
platforms
on how
they
intend
to bring
the
country
forward.
The
public
should
know
what
they
will
gain
from
electing
MPs from
these
particular
parties,
while
MPs
should
know
what
policy
decisions
to make
in order
to keep
in step
with the
policy
lines of
the
parties
under
whose
banners
they had
chosen
to run.
If
Thailand’s
political
parties
had
advanced
to that
stage,
Section
138
could
have
been
done
without.
On the
contrary,
the
Constitution
should
instead
contain
provisions
requiring
that MPs
submit
bills
that are
consistent
with
their
political
party
lines
and that
prior
approval
be
obtained
from
their
respective
political
parties
before
any
bills
can be
submitted,
as have
been
stipulated
in the
previous
Constitutions
since
1978
onwards.
Nevertheless,
it can
be
expected
that
Thailand’s
political
parties
in the
future
will
remain
as they
are.
Giving
MPs
autonomy
in
fulfilling
their
representational
roles
without
the
cumbersome
attachment
to
political
parties
may
perpetuate
the
weakness
of these
political
parties,
but it
may be a
worthwhile
approach
if the
public
stands
to
benefit
from
such
enhanced
MP
autonomy.
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